Introduction
Since 2001, government policymakers and security practitioners have recognised the need to work with individuals and organisations in Muslim communities to protect the United Kingdom against the threat of international terrorism. 1 The potential benefits of effective partnership and cooperation include the improved flow of information and intelligence to the police, a reduction in the backlash against state actions, and increased community capacity for countering violent extremism. 2 This 2 article focuses on the legal and policy framework of counterterrorism, which shapes the terrain within which partnerships are negotiated and trust is built. Careful calibration is needed to ensure that broad legal powers and policies support rather than undermine cooperation and partnership with community organisations.
Research on cooperation between the public and the police finds strong and consistent links between public willingness to cooperate and evaluations of the legitimacy of the police. Such legitimacy is shaped by experiences and expectations of procedural fairness. 3 Furthermore, evaluations of procedural justice link to social group identity; thus, it is not only how an individual is treated that impacts their evaluation of procedural fairness, but how others belonging to their social group and community organisations representing that group are treated. 4 Key features of fairness include the application of policies and rules in a way that is seen to be consistent and transparent.
Such transparency and consistency is important in avoiding the perception that rules are applied on the basis of personal prejudice or bias but are instead seen to be the result of the application of objective information and criteria. 5 The realistic possibility of identifying and challenging the abuse of executive powers is therefore important for procedural justice. The relationship between procedural fairness and cooperation appears to be particularly strong in the context of counterterrorism policing in the UK, as 'procedural justice concerns…prove better predictors of cooperation of British Muslims in counter-terrorism policing than either instrumental or ideological'
reasons for cooperation. 6 The British government has identified universities as a key site for recruitment by extremist organisations. This has made cooperation and partnership with both universities and student Islamic societies a primary focus in its counter-radicalisation strategy. The Counter-Terrorism and Security
Act 2015 steps beyond voluntary cooperation and partnership and places a legal duty on universities to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. Resistance to this, from teaching and student 
The Federation of Student Islamic Societies
FOSIS is one of Britain's oldest grassroots Muslim civil society organisations. Founded in 1962, the early period of post-war largely post-colonial labour migration to Britain, FOSIS was created to serve the pastoral needs of the growing number of Muslim students from overseas studying in Britain. In its early period, the group's political activism focused on political developments in the Middle East, drawing it to the attention of the Muslim Brotherhood and Jama'at-i Islami, thus creating an 'Islamist legacy' that continues to colour its public reputation. 7 For example, after 2005, those arguing for government to disengage from partnership with Islamist organisations cautioned against working with FOSIS. They argued that it was part of 'a sophisticated strategy of implanting Islamist ideology among young Muslims in Western Europe'. 8 The British government's review of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK was tellingly brief and careful in its evaluation of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, noting that associates and affiliates to the Brotherhood had 'at times' influenced FOSIS. 9 It provided no further details on whether this was a reference to its early or more recent history, nor the nature and type of influence. However, the contrast with the review's more detailed account of the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on other UK organisations suggests that the links with FOSIS is limited and historic. It is perhaps also a reflection of the change and diversity to be found in any student organisation, include student Islamic societies, where membership changes rapidly over short periods of time.
Today, FOSIS operates as an umbrella body that seeks to represent and serve Muslim students; its membership consists of affiliated student Islamic societies operating in British colleges and universities. These have a visible and active presence on many campuses. Three-quarters of Muslim students in London reported the presence of an Islamic society in their college and half said that they took part in its activities. 10 Students join Islamic societies for a variety of reasons. Many enjoy the chance to network and meet other Muslim students; Islamic societies also provide an opportunity for charitable and other humanitarian work. 11 They lobby and advocate on issues arising 5 from the religious needs of Muslim student, most notably in relation to provision of prayer space.
Relationships with university authorities can become strained when they mobilise students to protest against university policies that impact on religious practice.
In the 1990s, the growing participation of British Muslims in higher education should have created a greater role for student Islamic societies and FOSIS in the relationship between universities and Muslim students. Instead, growing concerns about the threat of religious fundamentalism and the visible presence of Hizb-ut-Tahrir on campuses culminated in a report from university authorities on extremism and intolerance and a National Union of Student's handbook on racism. Both documents were developed without consultation with FOSIS, even while other bodies seen as representatives of students that were the victims of the threat from Muslim religious fundamentalism, were consulted. 12 The conspicuous absence of FOSIS in the consultations implied the culpability of Muslim students generally in the extremist problem. 19 This definition provides the basis for constituting serious criminal offences out of actions which do not otherwise attract criminal liability; it also provides the trigger for the mobilisation of the full panoply of coercive executive actions from TPIMs and the proscription of organisations through to powers to stop and search individuals without the need for reasonable suspicion. The definition of terrorism is also relevant to the Prevent strategy, and the Prevent duty on universities, as this is aimed at preventing people from supporting terrorism or being drawn into terrorism.
The TA 2000 defines terrorism as any action (or the threat of action) which is 'made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause'. 20 Furthermore, the action must be 'designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public'. The definition encompasses 'action' which involves serious violence either against a person or against property, as well as 'action' which creates 'a 8 serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public', or is designed seriously to interfere or disrupt an electronic system. 21 Thus, it includes violence against property and actions affecting health and safety that fall short of endangering life. Furthermore, the 'action' may be physical action but can also be, for example, the publication of ideas. 22 The types of action that can constitute terrorism are broadened further by the lack of any geographical limitations; the definition covers actions anywhere in the world that seeks to intimidate the public or section of the public anywhere in the world or to influence any government in the world. 23 The legislation makes no normative distinction between democratic states and dictatorships; thus, a defendant possessing material likely to be useful for terrorism directed at the overthrow of the Libyan regime of Colonel Gaddafi was guilty of an offence even though the UK government enabled and welcomed the subsequent regime change. 24 The definition of terrorism contained in the TA 2000 outlined above has been described as 'remarkably' and, in some instances, 'absurdly' broad. 25 In noting that 'if it were judged to create a serious risk to public health, and if it was designed to influence government policy, its publication would be classed by the law as a terrorist action'. 27 As the earlier examples indicate, many of the actions that fall within the broad definition of terrorism are rarely treated as terrorism, some may be dealt with through the ordinary criminal law and public order offences, and others are unlikely to attract any official sanction or attention. The fact that actions which fall within the definition of terrorism are not pursued as such is not due to legislative precision but the exercise of executive discretion and restraint. 28 The danger is that the wide discretion afforded to the state in the application of counterterrorism laws has the potential to lead to discriminatory practices, with the term terrorism determined by the identity or assumed identity of the individual rather than the nature of their actions. There is a risk that the term terrorist is reserved for 'categories of perpetrators with which it is stereotypically associated'. 29 For example, while the definition does not provide for any hierarchy between the different types of political, religious, racial or ideological causes, in practice not all causes are treated the same. Anderson notes that in Northern Ireland it was widely believed that Republican violence was viewed through the lens of terrorism while Loyalist actions were more often dealt with as issues of public order or ordinary criminality. He goes on to suggest that 'in Great Britain, there may also have been a tendency to categorise Islamist-inspired violence as terrorism more readily than what is still often referred to as "domestic extremism"'. 30 Furthermore, the definition encompasses actions motivated by political or ideological beliefs such as animal rights, yet as Lord Carlile, Anderson's predecessor as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation notes, 'it has become the practice to deal with animal rights terrorism not using terrorist provisions … but under criminal law'. 31 While it is possible to argue that the law should not treat all forms of possible terrorism with moral and legal equivalence, the current legal framework avoids such normative judgements.
Ordinary criminal law already covers violence against property and person as well as any attempt, incitement or conspiracy of such offences. However, the scale of the harm that a terrorist action can entail has provided justification for extending the reach of the criminal law beyond directly harmful actions to the conduct leading up to that harm. The wide definition of terrorism is central to a growing number of offences that include the dissemination of terrorist publications, 32 acts preparatory to terrorism, 33 training for terrorism, 34 attending a place used for terrorist training 35 or failing to disclose information that might be of material assistance 'in preventing the commission by another person of an act of terrorism'. 36 The law, in these cases, is criminalising activities and conduct on the basis that they are likely to lead to terrorist action that is so harmful in its scale that it justifies this early intervention.
These developments can also be seen as part of a wider shift from a post-crime society, in which 'crime is conceived principally as harm or wrongdoing', to a pre-crime society, which 'shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so'. 37 Such offences may be better characterised as aimed at 'pre-emption' rather than 'prevention'
as it points towards an outcome that cannot be proven. 38 MacDonald refers to these as 'precursor crimes', noting that the ordinary criminal law of attempts 'criminalises acts that are more than merely preparatory' while 'precursor crimes focus on various forms of preparatory conduct'. 39 The problem with such offences is that they 'hold a person responsible now for her possible future actions'. 40 The further away temporally from the harmful action, the less reliable the prediction of future harmful acts that the offence is seeking to pre-empt. In such circumstances, 'measures based on what is described as "circumstantial evidence" come perilously close to criminalising risky types (rather than acts) and thoughts (rather than deeds)'. 41 The need to exercise discretion combined with a lack of clear guidelines on how it is exercised can add fuel to perceptions among some within Muslim communities that counterterrorism legislation is applied in a discriminatory fashion against Muslims. 42 For those who face prosecution for terrorism offences, the 'discrepancy between the wrong that the offence targets and what it actually encompasses' also means that the basis of their selection for prosecution does not lie in their actions alone. 45 Thus, great weight is placed on the discretion of the state on who to prosecute and this will be decided on the basis of whether or not the individual is seen to pose a threat to 'national security'. However, while the national security consideration is relevant for the prosecuting authorities in selecting a particular individual for prosecution, once that person is charged they will be judged by the law as set out in the statute. They cannot argue that the offence was not aimed at people like them, or that they have been unfairly selected for prosecution.
This denies 'individuals the opportunity to address the reasons they have been selected for prosecution' and undermines 'the courts' ability to deliver procedural justice'. 46 For student Islamic societies a key concern is around the offence of encouragement of terrorism that was introduced in the Terrorism Act 2006. The TA 2006 makes it an offence to 'publish' or cause to be published a 'statement that is likely to be understood by some or all members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism'. 47 The statute itself remains largely silent on the crucial issue of what constitutes direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement.
In respect of indirect encouragement there is some limited elucidation; it includes 'every statement which glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of acts of terrorism'. 48 What is particularly concerning is that fact that the offences can be committed recklessly, 49 and irrespective of whether or not anyone is in fact encouraged.
In determining whether a statement is 'likely to be understood' by some of the members of the public to whom it is made as an encouragement or inducement, the context and audience become critical factors. During the passage of the legislation the government explained that 'no offence will be committed if a member of an audience at an academic lecture thinks, "Well, I am not encouraged to commit terrorist acts, but I can quite imagine that, if this sentiment was expressed at a gathering of young Muslim men, it could have an encouraging effect on them" (emphasis added).' 50 The
Minister's comment, while trying to alleviate concerns about the chilling effect of the offence on free speech, inadvertently points toward the way in which statements made in the course of a student Islamic society talk or debate could be unlawful by virtue of the largely Muslim audience at such events, while the same statements would be unproblematic if made at other student society events.
A further concern is that the offence, while it does not have direct extra-territorial application, does For FOSIS and student Islamic societies, a further concern is the potential for any organisation that encourages or promotes terrorism to be proscribed under the TA 2000. 51 The promotion or 13 encouragement of terrorism 'includes any case in which activities of the organisation include the unlawful glorification of the commission of preparation of acts of terrorism' or where the organisation's activities 'are carried out in such a manner that ensures that the organisation is associated with statements containing any such glorification'. 52 The wide scope of these offences leaves student Islamic societies uncertain about the boundaries of the criminal law and may have a chilling effect on the discussion and debates they host and the speakers they invite. As proscription is an executive action, it lacks the same safeguards that would apply to a criminal prosecution. Muslims, had participated in PVE programmes during its pilot year alone. 57 Concerns about the policy's focus on funding towards Muslim civil society led to criticism that it was 'stigmatising, potentially alienating' and failed 'to address the fact that that no section of a population exists in isolation from others'. 58 Such criticisms contributed to the decision to separate Prevent and Cohesion policy, with responsibility for Prevent being placed with the Office of Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT) within the Home Office.
Concerns noted in this section
The relocation of Prevent to the OSCT reinforced concerns that Prevent projects were being used to develop an apparatus of state surveillance, gathering information about Muslim communities. 59 At the same time, the attempt to develop partnership with communities, appears to have given way to a far greater emphasis on the role of public sector agencies in identifying young people 'at risk' of radicalisation. This is solidified through the Counter Terrorism and Security Act (CTSA) 2015. The CTSA places a legal duty on public bodies, including universities, requiring them, in carrying out their functions, to have 'due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism'. 60 The statutory guidance accompanying this duty makes clear the expansive scope of this duty as it elaborates that 'being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, 15 which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit'. 61 Thus, the concern is not with all forms or expressions of non-violent extremism that can led to violence, rather it is only concerned with non-violent extremism related to the risk of terrorism. The need for a link with the potential for terrorist violence, ensures that expressions of homophobia, anti-Semitism and sexism by Muslims become a concern for security and counterterrorism policy while similar views from other students would be challenged through equality, diversity and anti-racism policies. The duty requires, 'frontline staff who engage with the public' to 'understand what radicalisation means and why people may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it' as well as the 'relationship between extremism and terrorism'.
Universities are required to 'provide appropriate training for staff involved in the implementation' of the duty. 62 The specific guidance for universities calls on the need to manage the risk of radicalisation off campus from radicalised students, noting that 'change of behaviour and outlook may be visible to university staff'. 63 The Russel Group of Universities, in their response to the consultation on the draft guidance, noted that 'students often undergo a developmental period in their lives whilst at university and their time there can prove to be a transformational experience. It is not at all unusual for students to display changing behaviours which are a natural part of their development'. 64 One of the problems in creating a statutory duty that applies across the education sector is the policy's reliance on assumptions about radicalisation that remain deeply contested. 65 Radicalisation is identified by Prevent as 'the process by which people come to support terrorism and, forms of extremism leading to terrorism'. 66 Research on radicalisation highlight different factors that are understood to contribute to the process, and posit various models of the relationship between ideological, social and psychological factors as well as group and individual dynamics. 67 Unable to identify which individuals holding radical ideas will cross the line from radical ideas to terrorist violence, counter-radicalisation policies fall back on identifying 'indicators'. As there is no typical profile of an extremist and no single indicator of when a person could move from holding extremist views to violent action, the reach of counterterrorism policies is wide and is used to justify greater levels of surveillance, deeper into Muslim communities and support pre-emptive intervention against those deemed to be 'at risk'. 68 The their own data which finds that 15 per cent of convicted 'Islamist terrorists' had attended universities in the UK. 72 As more than 40 per cent of Muslims leaving school at the age of 18 pursue higher education the data has been interpreted as showing that universities increase resilience, rather than vulnerability, to radicalisation. 73 The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, whose attempt in 2009 to detonate a bomb on an airplane in Detroit illustrates the problems in drawing a clear link between universities and radicalisation.
Contrary to the Centre for Social Cohesion's claim -that Abdulmutallab's radicalisation while studying at University College London (UCL) was an established fact -the Universities Minister revealed that the Security Services had not been able to 'pinpoint whether the university experience was the specific trigger'. 74 This was echoed by the Caldicott inquiry which found no evidence to support the claim that Abdulmutallab was radicalised while studying at UCL or that 'conditions at UCL during that time or subsequently are conducive to the radicalisation of students'. 75 Similarly, the 2012 Home Affairs Select Committee Report found there 'may be a much less direct link than was thought in the past' between university education and terrorist activity. 76 This led them to conclude that 'the emphasis on the role of universities by government departments is now disproportionate'. 77 With no clear and direct link between Abdulmutallab's university activities and subsequent terrorist violence, the focus shifts on to the broader notion of extremism and extremist activities. Thus, he is described as falling into the category of students that were 'attracted to and influenced by extremist ideology while at university' but who engaged in violence after leaving university. 78 It is within this wider focus on unacceptable extremism (rather than violence), that the 2011 Prevent Strategy singles out FOSIS for failing to 'fully challenge …extremist ideology,' and demands that FOSIS members take 'a clear and unequivocal position against extremism' (emphasis added). 79 The 2011 Prevent Strategy, only goes some way towards identifying some of these unacceptable extremist ideas: this includes the claim that the West is perpetually at war with Islam, ideas that oppose the legitimacy of interactions between Muslims and non-Muslims and claims that Muslims 'cannot legitimately and or effectively participate in our democratic society'. More opaquely it includes 'problems' that 'Islamist extremists can purport to identify…to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution'. 80 The Prevent Strategy also notes that the extremist narrative exploits perceived or real grievances at the local context, including claims of discrimination. Similarly, Lord
Carlile argued that 'support for extremism is often associated with a perception of discrimination…a sense of victimhood sometimes created, and always preyed upon by extremists'. 81 This creates a danger of deterring or silencing organisations that attempt to identify and challenge discrimination 18 and Islamophobia by implicating them in inadvertently furthering, if not deliberately propagating, extremist narrative of Muslim victimhood and grievance.
Of particular concern to FOSIS and student Islamic societies is the potential that their core welfare activities, including advocacy and lobbying for the accommodation of religious needs is reframed as providing support for extremist narratives of grievance and Islamophobia. For example, the former Higher Education Minster Bill Rammell, argued that the 'unreasonable' demands for the accommodation of religious needs of Muslims students created grievances that can be exploited and push students towards extremism. 82 This locates disputes over the right of Muslim female students to wear the niqab and disputes over the provision of adequate prayer space into the landscape of extremism. 83 In doing so, it exemplifies 'the way strategies of … "preventing" "terror"
have become so broad in scope as to include mundane requests for Muslim provisions.' 84 The legitimacy of such campaigns is brought into question when they are viewed through the prism of extremism as contributing to or perpetuating a terrorist narrative of Muslim victimhood. In fact, such a characterisation fails to see the extent that campaigns challenging discrimination and Islamophobia reflect claims of equal rights and engagement by Muslim as active citizens that are in fact a direct and effective challenge to any extremist narrative of disengagement or disempowerment.
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Challenging stop and search at airports
The ability of civil society advocacy organisations to challenge the discriminatory or arbitrary use of discretionary powers is important to ensuring procedural fairness, a key determinant of cooperation with the state. This section explores the role of FOSIS in leading a grassroots Muslim civil society campaign to challenge the use of powers to stop and search individuals at ports and airports.
As a community-based organisation that is rooted in, and connected to, the lived experience of was undertaken in 2012. This led to some important changes in the legal framework for the use of the power as well as a significant reduction in its use. 95 The FOSIS campaign, while successfully contributing to the pressure for a review of Schedule 7, brings into sharp focus the difficulties of challenging the misuse of a power that rests on a structure of broad discretion. The inability to prove improper exercises of the power inherent within the structure of the discretion it created undermines any possibility of securing procedural fairness.
Judicial comments on the exercise of discretion to stop people using powers under s44 TA 2000 are relevant to Schedule 7, as both allow for stops without the need for reasonable suspicion. 96 In a case before the House of Lords and then the European Court of Human Rights, challenging the use of s44, it was argued that the wide discretion granted to police officers in selecting individuals for stops meant that the power could be exercised in an arbitrary manner, leaving the 'public…vulnerable to interference by public officials acting on any personal whim, caprice, malice, predilection or purpose other than that for which the power was conferred'. 97 The House of Lords, when considering the case had commented that s44 stops should be used to selectively target 'those regarded by the police as most likely to be carrying terrorist connected articles' 98 and 'cannot, realistically, be 22 interpreted as a warrant to stop and search people who are obviously not terrorist suspects'. 99 It endorses the use of profiles that provide predictive assessments of who is likely to be a risk. While risk-based profiles are a legitimate tool, where the profile is developed to include data about the characteristics of those who have been convicted of terrorism-related offences, caution is needed as it is likely to include individuals convicted of pre-emptive offences, which themselves criminalise activities and actions based on assumptions about the profile of risky individuals. The Strasbourg Court, in its judgement of the case concluded that the 'breadth of discretion conferred on individual police officers' created a 'clear risk of arbitrariness'. They also noted that 'in the absence of any obligation on the part of the officer to show a reasonable suspicion, it is likely to be difficult if not impossible to prove that the power was improperly exercised'. 100 Furthermore, the fact that there may be good reasons for the profile that gives rise to the suspicion does not prevent it from being stigmatising. A stop that is targeted, because it is based on a carefully developed profile or other evidence, is simultaneously more stigmatising when it is a false positive and contributes to feelings of humiliation and alienation. 101 For Muslims such stops 'raise painful questions about how they are seen and positioned by others': they experience shock, hurt and confusion from the failure of the state to see them as 'respectable, moderate, law-abiding and contributing members of society'. 102 The lack of complaints and challenges may reflect strategies for managing 'risky' Muslim identities through performances of 'safe' identities. 103 Until the FOSIS campaign highlighting the scale of Schedule 7 stops, its impact remained largely unnoticed and below the radar of civil society activists and watchdog bodies. The limited number of formal complaints were noted as an indicator of the 'remarkable docility with which passengers for the most part submit to police questioning'. 104 The lack of complaints conceals the profound anger and resentment that many British Muslims felt from their experiences of Schedule 7. 105 Furthermore, in a context where disproportionality is to be expected and accepted as evidence of effective policy implementation rather than discrimination, the lack of complaints reflects the 23 difficulty Muslims in particular are likely to encounter in establishing that their stop is based on the unlawful discriminatory or arbitrary exercise of the discretion. It is perhaps not surprising that the high profile test cases that mainstream civil liberties campaign groups have used to challenge the use of s44 (Gillian and Quinton) and Schedule 7 (Miranda), and that have gained public attention, concern non-Muslims; in other words, people that so obviously do not fit the profile of those who likely to be terrorist suspects.
Acknowledging the limits and difficulties that Muslim students face in mounting a credible legal challenge to the use of Schedule 7 powers, FOSIS, as a grassroots organisation has focused its advocacy and campaigning in working with student Islamic societies to raise awareness among young Muslims of their rights when they are stopped. By raising the profile of the use of the power in the media, campaigning with other NGOs and through dialogue with the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws they contributed directly to the government's decision to review Schedule 7. Their campaigning places them in the broader British tradition of seeking social change and defending civil and political rights by applying 'pressure through law' 106 The success of their advocacy on schedule 7
highlights the vital role of grassroots community organisations in drawing attention to issues that directly affect Muslim communities.
Conclusion
Cooperation in counterterrorism policing increases when communities can be confident that legislation and policy is not implemented in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion: the ability to challenge executive overstretch, abuse or misapplication of powers is vital for maintaining procedural justice. This article has argued that the wide definition of terrorism, the broad discretion in the use of stop and search powers at ports, and the expansion of Prevent into the opaque terrain of non-violent extremism, are all key structural features of the counterterrorism legal and policy framework that operate to deter cooperation. 
